The Hermeneutic Analysis of Religious Experience as Expounded in Jnanamirta Kattalai - Intro Part 5.2

The Phenomenological Description ( Continuation )

First let us consider the author's concept of action. This is available in his discussion of karma (3.7-3.13).

The word 'karma' is used in the sense of 'action' and the 'causal' basis of action more appropriately labelled 'mulakarma' and so forth elsewhere. 

He classifies them into 

1. kayikam (<kayam; body), i.e. bodily or physical, 
2. vacikam (<vac: speech), i.e. verbal acts and 
3. manasam (<manas: mind), i.e. mental acts. 


Under kayikam he would include beating someone and so forth and worshipping the devas, i.e. the cariyai type of (religious) performances.[12]. By vacikam the author means not only scolding and so forth, i.e. the speech acts of J.L. Austin but also such performances as teaching, expounding, reciting and so forth of sacred literature, uttering loudly or softly the mantras and so forth. By 'manasam' the author means the thinking of doing this and that, and hence planning, contemplating, wishing; and also yogic contemplation on the nature of Parasiva, avoiding 'mentally', absorption in the lower forms of thought and so forth. 

Clearly the author is quite contemporaneous in his concept of action. It should be noted that only recently with the works of the Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin, the West has come to consider actions done with words, i.e. speech acts as a species of acts. The concept of mental act or cognitive act is again a very new concept; even now it is being entertained only by a group of cognitive psychologists who have utilized the computer as a model for investigating the mental processes of creatures (cf. Shotter and Gauld p. ix).

How did the author arrive at such a remarkable concept of action ahead of even very recent developments in philosophy, psychology and sociology? 

First of all it should be recalled that the concept of speech act is very ancient in the Tamil country. 

The bulk of Porulatikaram of Tolkappiyam (3rd century B.C.), termed kurriyal (Study of speech acts?) by Nakkirar, the commentator of Irayanar Ahapporul (8th century A.D.?) can be considered as a very extensive empirical study of speech acts, i.e. kurru. Tolkappiyar himself mentions that utterances (kilavi) are capable of effecting a variety of acts ('palveru ceyti' col. 456). He also lists a grammatical category 'munnam' which is explained as the stating of who speaks to whom under what kind of circumstances (Por. 508). We have also the distinctions between ahattinai and purattinai terms used to classify the verbal and non-verbal happenings in the world. 

In one sense it means the domestic and public (or political). In another sense they can be taken to classify happenings or events into 'inner' or private and 'outer' or publically observable. The 'inner' cannot be observed directly and has to be inferred through observable changes in behavior. This is very clearly stated in the sutra:

puratinai marunkin poruntin allatu

akattinai marunkil alavutal ilave

(por. aham)

In the chapter on 'meyppatu' we have equivalents of what are currently being investigated under the label 'non-verbal' acts. These are acts done by using the body or the body parts - the face, the hands, the fingers and so forth. Such acts may be unconscious but nevertheless they are actions as they succeed in communicating something.

In the ancient Tamil country there was a species of literature known as 'Naatakat Tamil', i.e. texts concerned with the grammar of dramas and the language of plays. Except for brief sketches in Cillappatikaram and Manimekalai, no complete texts have come down to us from those early periods. 

In the commentaries there are some sutras available but no complete texts or even sufficiently large chunks of it have survived. The earliest Naatakat Tamil we possess is that given in the commentary on Viracoliyam. A number of texts seem to have been written within the last five or six centuries. 'Paratacenapatiyam', 'Paratasankirakam', 'Mahaparata Cutamani' and so forth have been published. There are a few more that still await publication. 

What is of absorbing interest about these texts is that they contain, among others, an exhaustive analysis of different kinds of acts executed by dancers and actors in the dramas. The author of this text has availed of himself the extensive analysis of acts available in these texts. The technical terms kayakam. vacikam and manacam are not standard terms in Saiva Siddhanta texts but are so in the Naatakat Tamil texts mentioned above. In order to gain an understanding of the full sweep of the author's concept of action, the analysis available in Mahaparata Cutamani, reputed to have the most exhaustive analysis among all the texts in India, is sketched briefly.

'Pavam' is defined as the communicative act executed by a person by moving the neck, eye brows, eyes and other such body parts. In Paratacenapatiyam this term is restricted to mental acts and is equated with manacam (cf.manacam bavam sut. 11). This appears to be the case even in the Sanskrit 'Tacarupakam'.

The communicative acts are further classified into anubavam, vibavam, catvikabavam. vibapicaribavam and stayibavam. Acts communicative of inner feelings (antarankam) are anubavam. These are also subclassified into a variety of different types. By anubavam is also meant the observable aspects of the act in contrast to vibavam, the cause or inner stimulants of the act.

Catvikabavam are acts or happenings expressive of inner psychological states.

Vibapicaribavam are transitory or momentary acts that occur as component processes in the context of anubavam.

Stayibavam is a subclass of the above different types of acts that brings about supplementary and related processes in the context of anubavam.

Stayibavam is a subclass of the above different types of acts that brings about happiness or pleasurable feelings.

Abinayam is defined as the act of the dancer that communicates the meaning of the songs and is consistent with the rhythms (tala) being produced. It is further classified into ankikam, vacikam, akariyam and catvikam. 

Ankikam  is what is done with the body or body parts, 
vacikam  that which is done through words; 
akariyam  through attire and other decorations and 
catvikam  through dance postures and so forth.

All these are further subdivided into minute categories in terms of body parts used, movements executed, meanings conveyed, speed of execution, style of execution, feelings aroused and so forth (for details see 1st section of Mahaparata Cutamani).

It is not necessary to go into the details for the purposes at hand. These brief sketches of the contents of Naatakat Tamil is sufficient to indicate that the author has utilized such texts and his concept of action is a very comprehensive one indeed.

By 'action' he means not only beating, cutting, breaking and so forth but also reciting, speaking, reporting, narrating, studying, interpreting texts, expounding, instructing, guiding, performing pujas, the various cariyai and kriyai, thinking, meditating, contemplating, discriminating, delving deeper into lower levels of consciousness, communicating through gestures, words and so forth feelings, ideas, emotions and so forth, gesturing, signaling, enacting, acting out a theme, singing, dancing and doing an enormous number of things in that context, dramatizing and communicating through the attire chosen, postures assumed and so forth.

All these are considered actions for no matter what kind of action, they have something in common - they bring about something, they effect something. The term 'karyam' is used to mean both 'action' as well as the 'effect', i.e. what is brought about by the action. This aspect is the criteria or laksana that distinguish actions from non-actions. There is then agreement with White (1962) with respect to the identification of the criteria.

But still we are not clear as to the criteria the author uses to distinguish intelligent agent of actions from non-intelligent ones. 

For this purpose we have to examine very closely what the author means by describing Civa as Cattar, Uttiyuttar and Piraviruttar. What is immediately obvious is that these are not alternative terms for Brahma the creator, Vishnu the protector and Rudra the destroyer.[13]. 

The Cattar and so forth are descriptions of one and the same Civa and they are descriptions of the agentive aspects of Civa in relation to his activities that has brought about the universe and existence with whatever characteristics they have. Catter is the pre-intentional phase, the state of Civa purely as a potential agent. The Uttiyuttar is Civa as one who has already thought of, decided to bring about, inclined towards actualizing the universe and so forth. The Piraviruttar is Civa as the doer, as the one currently effecting, actively bringing about, carrying out the actions that actualize the universe and give whatever characteristics it truly has. The Piraviruttar form is Siva as in the world simultaneous with the phenomenal processes.

Cattar is also Civa with undifferentiated pure Power; it is Civa with power not yet directed or chanelled into anything. In other words we could say that Cattar is Intelligence-Power purely as a potential from the point of view of agency.

Uttiyuttar is Civa with a decision, intention, inclination to bring about the universe or the WILL. This indicates a consciousness of what to bring about and the activity of doing so, i.e. having in consciousness such-and-such. In other words now there is differentiation of Power into consciousness and Activity with Consciousness- Power being dominant. Uttiyuttar is then (Intelligence- (Consciousness>Activity) with consciousness excelling over Activity.[14].

When the Activity-Power becomes dominant, we have Civa as Piraviruttar, i.e. Civa as (Intelligence- (Consciousness<Activity)).

What this analysis seems to imply is that while action is effecting something, the agent is intelligent provided that the act or activity is indicative of conscious exercise of power. There must be evidence indicative of the simultaneous presence of consciousness, and regulativity. 

When the dynamical aspects are indicative of directed movement towards something that is intuitable as the goal, then we have evidence for the action to be that of an intelligent agent. The requirement that there be consciousness along with activity, it must be noted, rules out even modern challenges to the concept of intelligent activity that come from computer simulation studies. No doubt computers can simulate a number of activities that are customarily assigned only to living creatures and in particular to human beings. However computers, no matter how complex, are automatons and while it is true that they act, their actions are not guided by forms of awareness or consciousness. 

Computers are not the sorts of 'devices' that generate states of consciousness or awareness in the light of which activities are begun, maintained or terminated. For an activity to be intelligent there must be an END-IN-SIGHT towards which there is episodisation i.e. terminating the ongoing in order to make present something latent.

It must be mentioned that the above concept of intelligent activity and the view that the cosmic processes are in fact intelligent activities is as old as Saivism itself. Civa is the exerciser of power, the episodiser, the sangkara karanan, the pure Intelligence in any intelligent exercise of power that constitutes the action of an intelligent agent. Sakti is the pure ground that allows the exercising of power and hence all activities. No intelligent activity will be actualisable with Civa alone or Sakti alone. This is a common knowledge among Saivites who put it as 'Civaminri Sakti Illai, Saktiyinri Civam Illai (No Civa without Sakti, No Sakti without Civa). It is the union of Civa and Sakti, i.e. Civa-Sakti, Ammai-Appan and so forth that make intelligent activities possible and hence the cosmos and the whole of existence, a reality.

A number of objections can be raised now. 

Granted the correctness of the criteria for intelligent activities, one could not still conclude that the cosmic processes are controlled by Civa for they may be just processes proceeding blindly in a mechanical sort of way indicating that there is no Intelligence whatsoever behind it at all. While the basic texts of Saiva Siddhanta - Civajnana Botam, Civajnana Citti and so forth deal with such and similar issues very extensively it is sufficient to indicate one or two features of the counter arguments to make sense of the assertions of the author of the present text, i.e. what he offers as the premises for such conclusions as the above (sect. 1.8):

a) The universe is a complex of countless number of individuals with distinctive characteristics. It is a differentiated wholeness with no logical reason whatsoever to be so. From this it can be concluded that the universe, a complex of this and that is a product, an outcome, an effect of intelligent activities of cosmic proportions. For the individuals being non-intelligent, could not effect the kind of actions or activities that could have resulted in the generation of such a world with each individual having such distinctive characteristics.

b) An examination of the cosmic processes indicate that there is transformation of something from being subtle to gross, i.e. bringing forth into existence a variety of objects; maintaining them in existence or what is the same preventing them from being annihilated; terminating their existential state after a variable lengths of duration. In addition to that there are creatures afflicted with ignorance or blindness who are led gradually towards enlightenment. This indicates that there are processes that submerge creatures in ignorance or in something that causes such an ignorance to prevail in understanding and processes that illuminate them and liberate them from ignorance. . Clearly such processes could not be 'natural' processes. They are activities or actions indicative of an intelligent exercise of power or episodisations. They are intelligent processes that enable the creatures to learn and acquire knowledge and thereby liberate themselves from the delimiting constraints that afflict them and bring pains and miseries in their existence. There are in the world, processes that are pedagogical on account of this. In fact everything in the world have a pedagogical purpose, that of illuminating the creatures immersed in a primordial DARKNESS.

In order to fully understand the premise (b) above, the central logical features of the second section, the section on pacus will be considered very briefly. More extensive discussions are available elsewhere [15].

In Siddhanta both the cosmic processes and the bulk of the happenings attributed to creatures, including human beings, are intelligent activities. By the same canons of logic, from the premise that creature-activities are intelligent, it is concluded that there is an ego or psyche as the exerciser of power in such activities. The problem has been and perhaps still is, whether there is such a psyche distinct from Civa or not. There are many schools of thought ranging from the Saiva Vedantic position that there is no such a distinct and real ego to the Siddhantic position that there is. It must be noted here that what is termed 'Saiva Vedanta' is not the same as the mayavada of Sankara. For Sankara the reality of actions and the cosmic processes are questionable and are bracketed out and along with it the absolute reality of anything other than Brahman. Among the Saiva Vedanties we do not have this mayavadam but only the denial of the absolute distinctness of the psyche from Civa. The psyche is only the empirical self and when the 'empiricalness' of experience is no more, the empirical self is evaporated or disappears into Civa, the absolute Self. The Saiva Vedanta denies the absolute distinction between SIVA and anma at the metaphysical level only.

In order to see the rationale of the Siddhanta position, we must recall that Civa as Uttiyuttar and Piraviruttar is Intelligence- (Consciousness > Activity) and Intelligence-(Consciousness < Acitivity). In other words in the analysis of the agency of Civa, the power to Desire this and that is not brought in at all. This emerges however as an important feature of the analytical definition of creature agency. The individual psyches are agents but their agency is to be seen as 'Intelligence-( Desire-Consciousness-Activity)'. The creatures act and in that respect they are similar to Civa. But their actions are desire based, are purposive, intended to secure something for the benefit of the creature and so forth. In other words there is a qualitative difference in the agency of the creatures and Civa, a difference that indicates that the intelligence in the creatures is not Civa - not even 'reflections' of Civa in a complexly organized material substratum as Civaprakasar would assert in his Siddhanta Sikamani perhaps following the Samkhyas.

What is the primary reason for this claim? 

As the author of this text would put it (Sect. 2-8), the creatures experience pleasures and pains that are, we may add, psychological, moral, emotional and so forth - aspects of experience impossible if the agent is Civa Himself. Civa does not act for himself - though His activities are intentional, what is intended is not the satisfying of some kind of need, desire, lack and so forth. Civa is an integrated wholeness completely without any needs and therefore he has no reason to act for attaining something for himself. Such a reason exists only for the creatures causing them to be not only distinct from Civa but also phenomenal beings who have to execute a variety of acts to fulfill myriad of wants and wishes, desires for this and that and so forth.

Now since the experiencing of the pleasures and pains of all sorts are not uniform, varies from individual to individual, it also follows that we do not have one psyche in all the bodies but rather different psyches in different bodies. The psyches are different as their desires are different (sect. 2.7).

With such considerations as the above, the Saiva Siddhanta maintains the metaphysical difference between Civa and the psyches. The pacas, the third category of objects in fundamental ontology, are derived in the context for accounting for these differences and explaining the temporal history or historicity of the creatures and cosmos. The pacas derived thus are classified into anavam, kanmam and mayai. 

A few words must be said about the kinds of considerations that force us to accept the reality of these substances.

The servitude of the psyches, the bound delimited, restricted, non-autonomous nature of their behavior lead to the view that there must be a stuff inherently present in the constitution of the psyches accounting for such forms of behavior. This stuff is termed anavam and is said to be present in the psyches from the beginning. It is also anati, nonoriginary and hence uncreated in the sense that there does not exist another stuff by transforming which or episodising which anavam is generated; it is an ultimate category of objects just as Pati and Pacu. 

Any view contrary to this will lead to obfuscating the distinctions between Pati and Pacu, contradicting whatever analytical clarity and philosophical perspicuity that have been attained so far.

The laksanas of anavam are derived from the fact that the psyches are ignorant knowledge-wise, that they do not have any knowledge or understanding whatsoever unless they learn, and that too only if they are instructed, taught somehow . Primarily then anavam is a 'blocking' stuff - by its presence in the innermost constitution of the psyches, it causes the absence of knowledge, a DARKNESS to prevail. It also continues to act against any acquisition of knowledge, against the psyches attaining any enlightenment. Anavam reduces the psyches to utter servitude to something else for the acquisition of knowledge. That constitutes its chief characteristics. It is with the need (perhaps unconscious) to liberate themselves from this servitude that the psyches desire this and that, do this and that, move hither and thither becoming vulnerable to the vicissitudes of existence. 

There comes to be because of this, pleasures and pains, triumphs and failures, happiness and misery and such other existential states.

Such are the considerations underlying what the author says in sect. 3.1. The struggles of the psyches to liberate themselves from the obscurant anavam through various forms of episodisations has brought about the psycho-physical nature or the phenomenal presence of the psyches. As a consequence of such struggles they have become phenomenal creatures, earthly things with births and deaths, belonging to this or that species or genus, having this or that personality. These realities indicate that over and above anavam but certainly as a result of it, the psyches are afflicted with additional 'chains' or constraints. These are identified as 'karma' and 'mayai' (sect. 3.3-3.13).

The account of karma by the author is somewhat different from what is available in the canonical texts.

The author uses the term 'karma' in two distinct senses. One as a term for denoting actions that are further subclassified as kayikam, vacikam and manacam; the other as equivalent to 'mulakarma' or 'iruvinai', i.e. the causal karma latent schemata that is the flexible determinant of the psycho-physical or psycho-biological nature of the psyches. The section 3.7 contains the details of the author's view on this. 

Conceptually it appears to be similar to the genetic code of the biologists or more generally the 'program' of the computer scientists as applied to the psycho-physical 'bodies' of the psyches. It must be recalled here that Meykandar has described the individual creature as a psyche in a body that is a complex machine like entity [16]. Karma is the 'formulae' inscribed or written in the primordial stuff that underlies the generation of psycho-physical bodies of innumerable structures and forms. It is termed 'karma' for it is generated out of the actions done; 'atittam' for somehow it remains inscribed in the material substratum, and become operative at the appropriate time, 'canakam' for it regulates the generation of the physical bodies; tarakam for it is a basis along with others for the generation of the bodies; and 'pokiyam' as it is 'worked out', 'digested' in the course living or existing as a psycho-physical being. The author also concludes that it is dharma-adharma, i.e. psychic-nonpsychic for it is produced as a result of the interactions of the psyche with matter.

Though the issue is not discussed with any appreciable clarity, this causal karma is also taken to be the causal basis of the moral functioning of the ego, i.e. equivalent to the 'iruvinai' of Meykandar and Arunandi. The paragraph (3.11) closely parallels what Arunandi says about such issues in the Civajnana Cittiyar. This mulakarma, along with being the immediate cause of all kinds of fortunes and misfortunes, happiness and miseries, the quality of life, life expectancies and so forth is also the cause of the moralistic functioning of the creatures, the need to consider the moral worth of actions and issues in ordinary existence. This is seen as an aspect of servitude, bondage, a fall from the state of being fully autonomous or free. A moralistic individual, no matter how much he exceeds in doing good or the virtuous as opposed to evil, is still not autonomous in being tied down by moral reasonings. It is a chain that restricts an individual from full autonomous functioning.

The concept of karma as akin to formulae, a code implies that it's reality coincides with the reality of another stuff distinct from the Pati, pacu, anavam and 'work' and generate myriad of psycho-physical objects. This distinct stuff is termed mayai, the physical basis of all things, psychological, ideational and psycho-physical. As the author argues for its separate identity and reality (para. 3.6), karma could not subsist within the psyche as a part of its constitution (like anavam?) and if taken to be so then, the psyche will not be an intelligent entity capable of intelligent (though delimited) actions.

This mayai is subdivided into cuttamayai and acuttamayai with cuttamayai higher in the hierarchical organization. From the observations that cuttamayai is the basis for the origination of the phenomenon of language, mantras and so forth, it can be concluded that it is the stuff out of which are generated the various forms of consciousness - the contents of the semantics of language symbols, signs and other forms of meaning. It is the stuff that makes cognition and hence the various mental processes and functions possible. It is the basis for the forms of realities that are expressions of intelligence though in itself it is non-intelligent. It is said to permeate all material objects for otherwise the cognitive functions of the psyches that are in different material bodies could not become realities. From the observation that cuttamayai forms the basis for the 'body' of the vinnanakalar type of psyches, i.e. psyches that are delimited only by anavam, it follows that it is the stuff of the psychological nature of the psyches that are not due to karma, acuttamayai and so forth.

The acuttamayai, the 'lower' type of mayai is the primordial matter out of which the physicality of physical objects is generated. It also allows for the concretization of the psyches and other objects of world. The primary reason, as stated in para. 3.6, for postulating such an abstract stuff is the need for a receptacle to hold the karmic formulae and so forth during the cosmic involution, i.e. when the world as a whole is episodised. For unless there is such a receptacle, the regeneration of the cosmos and the continuation of the cosmic activities will not be possible. This acuttamayai is also the basis for psychic experiences of illusions, being misled, developing specific desires and so forth.

What we have said so far could be said to be the philosophical or ontological component of the first three sections. But they also contain observations that are not strictly speaking philosophical. Perhaps they could be considered as psychological or biological or more inclusively biophysical. Descriptions of this sort are what we have termed Deep Level constituent analysis and they are the sorts of studies undertaken in the hermeneutic sciences. The surface level structures require, for their description at least three distinct categories of metaphysical objects - pati, pacu and pacam. The Deep Level Description seek to describe their individual behavior, interactive processes, temporal histories and so forth in relation to causal agencies of elements in the deep structure.

The methodological principles employed can be seen as ontological analysis, analysis carried out with the question : What is there as real in the phenomena underlying it and agentively causing it? A phenomenal entity - an individual in the world or even the whole universe is assumed to be a complex of distinct elements with changes in state, activities and so forth to be accounted for in terms of changes of various sorts in the compositions or in the interrelationship among the deep Structure elements. The guiding principle in this form of constituent analysis is that they must explain and not explain away what are stated in surface level descriptions. They must serve to explain, account for the observable 'behavior' of the universe, the creatures and other individuals and the quantitative and qualitative changes that are seen. Of particular importance is the need to provide an account of the developmental progress of the creatures and the linkages that exist between the development and the actions done.

The elements of this Deep Structure are termed tattuvas, which incidentally is a Sanskrit adaptation of the Tamil 'mey' meaning 'body' , 'stuff 'and 'truth'. The term is very ancient and occurs approximately in this sense in Sumerian (i.e. before 2000 B.C.). The following are examples of such usages.

From 'Lamentation Over the Destruction of Ur', we have

16. an-ra a-i-bi-ma me-e he-im-ma-na-de

To Anu the water of my eye verily I poured.

an-ra a(l) imai (em) ma mey-ye ituyimmana

(an>annal, a>al, am: water, ibi>imai: eyes,

ma>emma: me>mey: truely, de>idu: make)

The 'me' here means 'truly', 'verily' and so forth, a sense that is true of Ta. 'mey' even now.

From 'Exaltations of Innana' composed by Enhuduanna, which is actually a hymn to Kotravai, we have the following lines where 'me' occurs in the sense of tattuvas.

1. nin me sar-ra u dalla-e-a

Lady of all me's resplendent light

(nin mey carva ol tella-yi-a)

sar-ra > carva: all (>sk. Sarvam), u>ol, oli: light,

dalla > tella, tellia: clear, resplendent

5. me-imin-be su-sa-du-ga

Whose hand has attained (all) the 'seven' me's?

(mey imin (?) pe cey cutuka)

6. nin-mu me-gal-gal-la sag-kesda-bi za-e-me-en

oh my lady, you are the guardian of all the great me's.

(nin mo mey kal kal la canu kattupi aye man)

7. me mu-il me su-zu-se mu-e-la

You have picked up the me's you have hung the me's on your hand.

(mey mo iyal mey cey nuvcey mo ilai)

8. me mu-ur me gaba-zu bi-tab

you have gathered up the me's you have clasped the me's to your breast.

(mey mo or mey pakam nuv taippi)

su>cey>key,kay: hand; sag>can>cenni: head; kesda>

kattu: bind; il>iyal: to move; e-la> ilai: to wear; ur>

or: to gather up; gaba> pakam (meta thesis): chest; tab>

tai-p/t: to pin up

Even today 'mey' is used in this sense in the Tamil philosophical literature. In third millenniums B.C., the number of mey's identified was seven. In recent past it has increased to ninety-six.

Many more evidences can be adduced to show quite convincingly that the type of ontological analysis so characteristic of Indian philosophical tradition is native to the Tamil people of India and was already in a matured form even in the third millenium B.C. in the lands of Sumeria, Elam and Meluha (i.e. Indus Valley).Such tatvas are arrived at through at first securing a true phenomenological description of the world and later seeking to disclose the relatively permanent underground elements that fabricate the phenomenal realities. The mey or tatvas are these underground elements that serve to explain the observable.

The sections under the heading 'An Account of Creation' seek to provide a description of the origination, structural changes in state and behavior and so forth in terms of a finite number of tatvas without violating the surface level descriptions discussed above. The tatvas appear to be something like force fields in physics interacting in myriad of ways and thus though finite in number but giving rise to an infinity of objects, processes, and events. This section contains what we have termed the generative description.

Since the contents are self explanatory, we shall not discuss the features but go on to the third question the author deals with.


Loganathan @ Ullaganar

( to be continued )