The Phenomenological Description
It is the contention of the Saiva Siddhanta school of thought that without the assumption of the reality of Pati, Pacu and Pacam, a valid description of the world is impossible.
On the assumption that this FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY needs to be reestablished, the author describes the distinguishing characteristics (laksanas) of these three types of entities, the logical premises for invoking these entities and the manner in which they interact or stand in relation to each other constituting the phenomenal world.
The provision of logical premises for the reality of these three categories hinge on the observation, as already mentioned, that creature behavior is essentially one of acting, taking of actions, doing this and that for a variety of reasons, and the possibility of extending such an observation to the cosmos as whole, i.e. the possibility of a homology, a structural similarity, between the creatures and the cosmos. The unifying notion is that of TEXT, that which is analysed in the hermeneutic sciences.
The special feature of this is the impressive logical coherence with which the author proceeds in this task. But we must add, though impressive in a way but not as profound as that of Meykandar , Arunandi or the other great masters.
First let us consider the logical premises or evidences in the form of observable and hence nonproblematic features he adduces for establishing the metaphysical realities of Pacu, Paca and Pati.
As a fact of empirical observation, we can distinguish between intelligent activities and non-intelligent activities. Intelligent activities are those that are done by intelligent creatures (cetanapporul), non-intelligent activities are those by non-intelligent entities (acetanapporul). Now a person (or creature) acts, takes actions and so forth, and in view of the fact that he/it initiates actions, clearly what actually does the action, or acts could not be the body or any constituent of the body for they are non-intelligent (catam) and non-intelligent entities, though can have actions of various sorts, cannot initiate an action or act to accomplish something , i.e. be intentional.
Once we cannot make this distinction, then we cannot also maintain the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent activities.
This appears to be the purport of the passage (2.10).
This argument requires a deeper analysis in view of its centrality for Saiva Siddhanta. As Alan R.White [9] has observed , to act is to bring about something, to cause something to happen; an action is the bringing about something. An agent or author is that which brings something about. This elucidation of the meaning of action does not allow us to conclude that, given that a particular happening can be truly described as being the doing of an action then the agent is necessarily an intelligent entity. For in this view it is perfectly possible for materials to be the agents. Poisons can kill plants and animals, the sun can dry up rivers and lakes, storms can uproot trees, destroy houses and so forth. To attribute or ascribe an action to something or someone, as White [10] observes, is only to ascribe causation for what is brought about.
A human action then, on this view will be an action whose author is a human being. But stopping at this level of analysis will not do for the kinds of inferences the author of this text makes and he obviously does not do that.
In order to affirm that an activity is the activity of an intelligent agent, it would become, on this view necessary to independently affirm whether a particular agent is intelligent or not. The problem is that this may not be possible for frequently it is the action done and the aspects associated with it, the observable surface structure features, that allow us to conclude whether the agent is intelligent or not.
What characteristics of actions themselves would allow us to conclude that the agents are intelligent or non-intelligent? What aspects of behaviour lead us to understand that as being executed by an intelligent agent? What aspects of the Surface features would allow us to deduce the presence of an intelligent entity in Deep Structure as the real causal Agent?
Clearly this is a basic question in Saiva Siddhanta and the author of this text succeeds somewhat in providing this criteria.
But before we come to that let us consider some possibilities that have been suggested by Western philosophers. White (1962) has provided a brief survey of these views:
a) The grammatical category of verb could be used as such a criteria. One could say that what is expressed by a verb is an action. Tolkapiyar distinguishes between vinaikurippu (intentinal or intransitive verb) and vinaimurru (completional or transitive verb) and defines vinaimurru as a term that signifies a deed, tense, gender and number.
Clearly such grammatical characterizations are inadequate and mistaken. 'Viluntan', for example, is a vinaikurippu but vilutal (falling) is clearly not an action. Tolkapiyar seems to be aware of this for he has a separate sutra to define tolil (deeds) in terms of basic constituents (tolil mutalnilai).
The basic constituents he lists are: agent or author (ceyvatu), deed (vinai), object on which action is effected (ceyapatuporul), location (nilam), time, tense (kalam), instrument (karuvi) and the knowledge that this action brings about that effect (innatarku itu payan) or intention. [11]
Clearly these are neither necessary nor sufficient. Some of these elements at least appear to be optional, e.g. instrument, object and the knowledge of consequences. Jumping is an action but it is not effected on something, nor an instrument used for that purpose. Furthermore one need not always jump with the knowledge that it brings about something. One can jump simply for the pleasure of it.
b) Aristotle seems to have given such criterial features as 'kinesis', 'energeia', 'praxis' and 'poiesis' to distinguish actions from non-actions. However White points out quite clearly their inadequacy. There is kinesis (e.g. become, be moved) and energeiai (e.g. understand, be happy) but these are not actions; there is kinesis (build) and energeiai (listen) which are actions.
c) Some philosophers offer the following explanation: To say X is a human action is not to describe anything that happened but to 'ascribe responsibility' for it. The attempt to provide criteria seems to have shifted from the characteristics of the processes themselves to the quality of the relationship between the agent and what is done. However there are difficulties even in this criteria.
Some of these, as mentioned by White, are as follows: One could be responsible for not only to actions but also deeds that are not actions, e.g. successes. It also does not serve to distinguish being responsible for a happening (e.g. damage to a window) and being responsible for one's action in bringing about a happening, e.g. breaking a window. Also it appears to be perfectly reasonable to ascribe responsibility to inanimate objects without any animistic feelings. We can say the storm is responsible for the destruction of the city and so forth without implying that the 'storm' is an animate kind of entity.
Also 'A' is responsible for 'X' and 'A did X' are not the same in meaning for clearly there are many instances where a man can be held responsible for but which are not things he has done. We have the distinction 'kariakarutta' and 'karanakarutta' in Tamil grammar to distinguish between these two senses in which a person can be related to an action.
d) Some antecedents may be cited as constituting the definitive criteria for distinguishing human actions from others. In the West these antecedents have been termed 'the will'. A human act or action is taken to be a bodily movement following from or caused by the will, a volition or an act of will.
The criticisms directed against this view can be summarized as follows:
i) It fails to distinguish between an act and a voluntary act. Not all acts are voluntary. To say that a happening is not an act is rather different form saying that it is an act but not a voluntary act. The distinctions of 'voluntary' and 'obligatory' are distinctions of conditions of doing something and hence presuppose the doing something.
ii) Doing something voluntarily is not the same as doing something preceded by a volition or act of will. To do X voluntarily is to do X with the knowledge that one has other choices open to one. It presupposes a decision to do X with the knowledge that one could decide otherwise. Where one does something without being preceded with such a decision, e.g. doing X unintentionally, unknowingly, inattentively and so forth, though one could be said to do something, it need not at the same time be something done voluntarily or involuntarily.
iii) Such antecedents as effort of will, resolution, intention, decision and so forth are contingent rather than necessary antecedents. It happens to be the case in a number of occasions but are not universally the case. We often do things without any effort of will, without any deliberations or planning, intention or purpose. Also it is not clear in what sense such prior processes can cause or bring about bodily movements.
e) The possibility of qualifying certain events or happenings in certain ways has been offered as a means of distinguishing human actions from others. Such adverbial characterization as: impulsively, deliberately, intentionally, automatically, thoughtlessly, unwittingly, reluctantly, knowingly, unknowingly and so forth have been suggested. Also it can be praised, sanctioned, approved, disapproved, morally censured and so forth. It can be right or wrong pitied or blamed and so forth.
The possibilities of such qualifications do not offer laksanas for distinguishing actions from non-actions or even human actions from non-human actions. They do not indicate that the 'mutalnilai' of actions are being voluntary, intentional, purposive, conscious, moral, immoral and so forth. It may be right to consider such things as above, given that a particular happening is already taken to be an instance of human action. Even this possibility does not tell us what exactly it means, does not isolate that distinguishing characteristic of human actions.
With this preliminary survey let us come to our author's analysis and the criteria he offers.
The distinction of interest for the Tamil Saiva Siddhanta is first of all that distinction between the actions of intelligent and non-intelligent agents.
Loganathan @ Ullaganar
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